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Abstract 
Previous research has found associations between gender, birth order, personality traits and 
risk-taking behavior. The aim of the current study was to determine to what extent these 
findings are true with the help of the Big Five Inventory, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale and 
a self-developed videogame. In connection with risk-taking behavior, the mechanisms of Risk 
Homeostasis Theory by Wilde were investigated in order to identify its possible relevance for 
safety measures in road traffic environments. Therefore, 178 people were tested on their risk-
taking behavior and their gender, birth order as well as their prevailing personality traits were 
assessed. It was examined that only gender serves as a predictor of risk-taking behavior in 
contrast to birth order and personality traits. With regard to Risk Homeostasis Theory, the 
present study partly provides support for compensatory effects but no homeostatic effect was 
revealed. Possible flaws in the design of the videogame may be accountable for the present 
study’s failure to locate a homeostatic effect. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Accidents
Accidents are a manifold phenomenon which people may encounter in various settings 
and activities such as in the workplace, traffic situations, during leisure activities and so forth. 
Since they often result in serious injuries, accidents are a major public health concern in line 
with malnutrition, diseases or mental health (Hongsranagon, Khompratya, Hongpukdee, 
Havanond, & Deelertyuenyong, 2011). Road traffic accidents on its own annually cause 
between 20 and 50 million non-fatal injuries worldwide, according to the World Health 
Organization (2013), leaving numerous victims with lasting damages. On top of that, 
approximately 1.24 million people are estimated to die in road traffic accidents every year. 
Accordingly, road traffic accidents represent a considerable challenge for public health and 
account for substantial economic costs (Mcdonald, 2005; Whitelegg, 1987). In order to 
decrease the number of road traffic accidents, it is crucial to indentify its determinants. 
1.2 Risk taking as contributing factor to traffic accidents 
Human error, or in other words unsafe behavior, has been found to be a major cause of 
traffic accidents (Lu, 2006; Parker, Manstead, Stradling, & Reason, 1992). While human error 
can arise from unintended actions such as memory failures and attention failures, it can partly 
be attributed to intended actions such as risk-taking (Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter & 
Cambell, 1990; Reason, 2000). Speeding or overtaking in blind bends are typical practices 
which illustrate risky behavior in road traffic settings. Generally, road users are thought to be 
influenced in their willingness to engage in risky behavior by their distinct perception of risk 
(Deery, 1999). Risk perception  may be defined as an individual’s assessment of  the 
likelihood of being affected by imminent dangers in connection to the evaluation of one’s 
coping abilities and overall means of resistance (Kinateder, Kuligowski, Reneke, & Peacock, 
2015).  
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The general approach of making road traffic safer has, up to now, been to limit the 
probability of imminent dangers to road users. This has been done by approaching the whole 
traffic system instead of focusing on incorrect actions by individuals (Reason, 2000; World 
Health Organization, 2004). Safety measures including stricter traffic legislation, driver 
education, compulsory seatbelt use, safe infrastructure design and increased vehicle safety 
standards have been implemented to protect road users (Lu, 2006; World Health 
Organization, 2013). The underlying motive for this approach of preventive interventions is 
the assumption that more protection translates into less risk (Roads and Traffic Authority of 
New South Wales, 2011; Zinn, 2015). The pivotal question is, to what extent road users’ risk 
perceptions, which are embodied in their driving behavior, are influenced by their awareness 
of the numerous preventive interventions in place.  
1.3 Determinants of risk-taking behavior 
While Simonet and Wilde (1997) specify risk as the likelihood of being involved in an 
accident, risk-taking can, in a broad sense, be defined as the behavior of engaging in actions 
which may lead to undesired outcomes and may harm oneself or others (Broman-Fulks, 
Urbaniak, Bondy, & Toomey, 2014; Maslowsky, Buvinger, Keating, Steinberg, & Cauffman, 
2011). It is suggested that the level of risk one is willing to take depends on situational, 
demographic as well as on personality factors (Norris, Matthews, & Riad, 2000; Wang, 
Kruger, & Wilke, 2009; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). Whereas situational factors may 
include weather conditions or density of traffic, demographic factors address elements such as 
gender, age, or birth order. 
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1.3.1 Demographic factors 
1.3.1.1 Gender 
Women have frequently been described as the more risk averse sex. Turner and 
McClure (2003), for example, conducted a study in which participants were asked to rate their 
attitudes towards different driving behaviors and to indicate their overall risk-taking behavior. 
It was found that women considered themselves as driving less aggressively than men and 
that woman showed a generally lower risk acceptance than men did.  
Montgomery, Kusano and Gabler (2014) analyzed the influence of gender on risky 
driving behavior in a more practical way. They made use of the data from a naturalistic 
driving study. The vehicles included in this study were either owned by the drivers or leased 
and were equipped with a camera as well as additional measurement appliances such as radar 
sensors. It was objected to reveal whether there is a difference between men and women at the 
point of breaking when they were following other cars in their typical daily driving activities. 
The result was that women braked on average 1.3 seconds earlier than men did, what indicates 
that they are more risk averse than the opposite sex. 
1.3.1.1 Birth order 
Besides, several studies claim that first-borns are less likely to act in risky ways than 
later-borns (Argys, Rees, Averett, & Witoonchart, 2006; Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010; 
Wang et al., 2009). In a large sample of approximately 9000 adolescents ranging mainly 
between 12 and 17 years of age, Argys et al. (2006) found that firstborns were less likely to 
have smoked tobacco or marijuana, to have drunken alcohol and to have had sex as compared 
to their younger siblings. Additionally, their data suggest that later-borns are more likely to 
engage in risky behavior than second-borns.  
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Also Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010) identified first-borns as the more risk averse 
siblings in their meta-review of 24 studies on the association of birth order and risk-taking 
behavior. Their investigation revealed that later-borns were 1.5 times more likely to engage in 
dangerous sports than first-borns. 
A recent study by Krause et al. (2013) however, questions the effect of birth-order on 
risk-taking behavior. In their study, altogether 200 people originating from two different 
samples were tested in order to evaluate the effects of birth order on both risk perception and 
risk-taking in two independent settings: Sample A was composed of 100 students and 
characterized as low risk exposed, whereas sample B compromised 100 extreme athletes who 
were characterized as high risk exposed. Their overall conclusions indicate that first-borns 
seem to be less risk aware and at the same time less risk-averse than later-born subjects. As 
possible explanations for these findings, the authors address disparities in the level of 
education as well as in social background among test subjects. 
1.3.2  Personality factors 
1.2.2.1 Big Five Inventory personality traits 
Sulloway (1995) in turn, who supports the theory that first-borns are in general more 
risk averse than later-borns, provides a possible explanation for this different risk behavior 
concerning birth order in his meta analysis by referring to the Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
personality dimensions. These distinguish between the five opposing personality traits of 
extraversion versus introversion, agreeableness versus antagonism, conscientiousness versus 
lack of direction, neuroticism versus emotional stability and openness versus closedness to 
experience.  
See Figure 1 for an overview of the Big Five Personality dimensions.  
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Figure 1. Big Five Inventory personality dimensions with respective character traits. 
A personality trait is commonly referred to as a stable intra-individual predisposition 
which is in contrast to an attitude not evaluative nor object-related (McGhee, 2012; Ulleberg 
& Rundmo, 2003). McCrae and Costa (1995) defined traits as underlying tendencies within 
people which determine their enduring structures of thoughts, feelings and actions. 
The personality trait extraversion versus introversion describes a person’s universal 
surgency and the type of interpersonal behavior one predominantly engages in (John, 
Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). People scoring high on 
extraversion are hence characterized as sociable, outgoing, energetic, adventurous, forceful 
and enthusiastic, whereas  individuals scoring high on introversion are rather reluctant, alone 
and independent. The personality trait of agreeableness versus antagonism does also refer to 
interpersonal relationships. Individuals characterized as agreeable are in general more 
altruistic and show sympathy and goodwill in dealing with others. They tend to trust in 
people, are willing to help, cooperate and to forgive. Antagonism in contrary, unifies features 
such as egocentricity, distrust and competitiveness. The personality trait of conscientiousness 
versus lack of direction specifies the degree of self-control, purposefulness and accuracy 
someone exerts on a regular basis. Highly conscientious people on the one hand are thought to 
be efficient, organized and thorough. While Individuals with a lack of direction on the other 
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hand can be defined as careless, lazy, and impulsive. The personality trait of neuroticism 
versus emotional stability reflects individual differences in the experience of negative 
emotions. Neuroticism manifests itself in tense, irritable, shy and moody temper as well as in 
discontent and lack of self-confidence. An emotional stable person can be described by 
contrary characteristics. The fifth and last personality trait of the Big Five Personality 
dimensions, openness versus closedness to experience, gives an indication of one’s interest in 
and engagement with new experiences and impressions. Openness to experience is typical for 
people who are curious, imaginative, artistic, excitable, unconventional and equipped with 
wide interests. Individuals who score high on closedness to experience are usually rather 
conservative and prefer familiar things to new things. 
In Sulloway’s review of altogether 196 studies, 72 studies supported his hypotheses 
that first-borns score higher on antagonism, extraversion, conscientiousness and neuroticism, 
and lower on openness in comparison to later-borns (Sulloway, 1995). Only 14 studies 
showed conflicting results with respect to Sulloway’s hypotheses while the remaining 110 
studies did not point in either direction. These findings seemed to be independent of age and 
thus not fading in the course of people’s development. However, not all personality 
dimensions seem to be equally strong connected to birth order. According to Sulloway’s 
analysis, the largest effect can be found for openness, followed by conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, neuroticism and extraversion in a descending order. 
Anitei, Chraif, Burtaverde and Mihaila (2014) investigated the association of the BFI 
personality traits and aggressive driving which may be categorized as risk-taking behavior. In 
their study among 100 psychology students between 18 and 25 years, Anitei et al. (2014)  
identified neuroticism - or put differently - emotional stability as a predictor of aggressive 
driving. The higher the emotional stability of participants, the less aggressive their driving 
behavior. Accordingly, highly neurotic participants were associated with more aggressive 
12 
 
 
 
driving behavior. The researchers furthermore tested their hypothesis that extraversion would 
be positively related to aggressive driving. However, the findings of their study did not 
support this assumption. Instead, the surmise of negative relations between conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, openness to experience and aggressive driving was supported. 
But why may personality traits serve as an explanation for risk-taking behavior? 
According to McCrae and Costa (1995) personality traits can be seen as an indirect 
explanation of behavior because they partly constitute the motives, habits and attitudes which 
in turn directly influence behavior. Thus in other words, personality traits may partly account 
for our perception of the world – and therewith also for our risk perception. Consequently, 
they are indirect determinants of our risk-taking behavior, because we take action 
corresponding to our individual perception of risk. In contrast to factors such as birth order, 
personality traits are thought to be independent of learned culture (McCrae & Costa, 1995). 
They seem to explain our ubiquitous human nature and therewith also our individual appetite 
for risk. 
1.2.2.1 Impulsiveness 
Previous research on the association between personality and risk-taking behavior is 
extensive. Sensation-seeking is often named as a major personality characteristic to be related 
to risky behavior. A whole body of literature emphasizes that sensation-seekers may be 
characterized as drivers with a high risk for being engaged in accidents (Heino, Van Der 
Molen, & Wilde, 1996; Jonah, 1997; Oltedal & Rundmo, 2006; Smorti, 2014). Sensation-
seeking manifests itself in a disposedness to new and intense experiences. 
Closely related to sensation-seeking is impulsiveness which has been suggested to be 
another determinant of risk-taking behavior (Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & Kuhlman, 2005). The 
main difference between the two concepts is that sensation-seeking can be ascribed to one’s 
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preference for novel stimuli and risk behavior, whereas impulsiveness can be attributed to a 
certain lack of self-control to keep oneself away from risky activities (Dahlen et al., 2005; 
Rodríguez-Fornells, Lorenzo-Seva, & Andrés-Pueyo, 2002). Impulsive individuals are likely 
to quickly respond to stimuli and to act without thinking about consequences. Therewith, 
impulsiveness may be seen as the opposite of conscientiousness, which is one of the BFI 
personality dimensions (Schwebel, Severson, Ball, & Rizzo, 2006) and by Sulloway identified 
as a major factor explaining variety in risk-taking behavior. Elander, West and French (1993) 
identified conscientious individuals who carefully make decisions and are deliberate as less 
likely to being involved into road traffic accidents, independent of the driver’s sex, age or the 
numbers of kilometers driven. Hence, the findings of Elander, West and French (1993) do 
support Sulloway’s hypotheses and stress the relevance of impulsiveness for risk-taking 
behavior in traffic situations. In a similar vein, Stanford and colleagues (1996) reported that 
impulsive adolescents and young adults demonstrate riskier behavior, expressed in 
aggression, drug use, drunk driving and reduced seatbelt use, than their peers scoring low on 
impulsiveness. 
Facing the fact that personality is greatly diverse, a major challenge in rating risk 
perception and therewith estimating risk behavior may lie in the complexity of people’s 
personalities. This challenge is also reflected in developing appropriate safety measures to 
protect road users from traffic accidents. While for some road users regulations and linked 
punishments for violations might work, other individuals might be indifferent for these sort of 
safety measures and violate nevertheless. So one reason why preventive interventions are not 
as successful as men wishes, by often failing to affect drivers’ behavior, may be that safety 
measures are not tailored to people’s various personality traits (Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003).  
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1.4 Risk Homeostasis Theory 
Another explanation relates to the notion that the implementation of preventive 
interventions may actually mislead road users to engage in increased risk-taking behavior. 
Risk Homeostasis Theory by Wilde (1982) states that preventive interventions usually lower 
people’s perceived risk which in turn often leads them to engage in risky behavior since they 
aim to optimize risk instead of eliminating it (Wilde, Robertson, & Pless, 2002). That is, 
people strive to maintain a certain optimal level of risk which represents their general 
willingness or appetite of risk. This targeted level of risk is therefore constantly compared to 
the perceived or experienced level of risk in one’s environment. Whenever the perceived 
reality seems to be divergent from one’s targeted optimal level of risk, compensatory actions 
are taken. In general, safety measures are believed to lower one's perceived level of risk and 
therewith disturb the balance between perceived and target level of risk. A lower perceived 
level of risk than one's target level of risk implies engaging in risky actions. People speed or 
keep less distance to other vehicles, for example. Therefore, Wilde assumes that non-
motivational safety measures intending to prevent accidents, such as compulsory seatbelt use, 
driver education or safe infrastructure design, are only successful until the point that drivers 
become aware of their increased safety (Wilde, 1982). The general problem with non-
motivational safety measures and preventive interventions is that they exclusively focus on 
lowering the perceived actual risk. What is needed to successfully lower a population’s 
accident rate per capita in the long run instead, is to lower their willingness to take risks, 
according to Risk Homeostasis Theory (Hoyes et al., 1996; Wilde, 1982). 
1.4.1 The closed loop model 
This is due to that fact, that people’s willingness to take risks is the only parameter 
outside of an ongoing closed loop process which can best be described with the help of a 
thermostat (Wilde, 1982). Figure 2 illustrates this process in a model. 
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Figure 2. Homeostatic model on driving behavior and related accidents by Wilde (1982). 
People’s general appetite for risk can be seen as the temperature setpoint of a 
thermostat. A thermostat makes sure that the desired temperature set for a certain room 
remains constant as much as possible. On that account, it senses the temperature of the room 
and compares it to the set temperature. Whenever those two parameters differ from each 
other, the thermostat undertakes regulative actions such as cooling or heating. The aim of 
these regulative actions is to reach and maintain the temperature setpoint. An important point 
in this context is that the resulting room temperature, which figuratively speaking represents 
the population’s resulting accident rate, does fluctuate due to the adjustment actions of the 
thermostat which are influenced by the sensitivity of the thermometer, the quality of the 
temperature switch function as well as the furnace’s heating capacity (such influencers of 
adjustment actions in traffic settings may be the decisional and vehicle handling skills of a 
driver). However, averaged over time the room temperature does stay relatively constant, or 
in other words ‘homeostatic’. The only factor which can influence the room temperature over 
time is the temperature setpoint. Similarly, the only factor which can change the accident rate 
per capita over time is a population’s willingness for taking risks. The assumption which 
explains the circular process of Risk Homeostasis Theory, is that a population’s resulting 
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accident rate in turn influences people’s perceived level of risk. That is, when people get to 
know that the average accident rate per capita changed, they perceive the traffic environment 
as less or more safe and do again take adjustment actions in case the newly perceived risk 
level deviates from their targeted level of risk. The cycle, in which drivers’ behavior 
determines the amount of accident loss, and the accident loss in turn determines drivers’ 
behavior, is in progress again (Wilde, Robertson, & Pless, 2002). Due to that fact that some 
time may pass before the amount of accident loss does influence people’s perceived level of 
risk, because accident rates are only published annually, for example, the model indicates a 
lagged feedback. 
1.4.2 The target level of risk 
Having identified the target level of risk as the only parameter to determine the 
amount of accident loss over time, what could be done to lower the target level of risk? In 
order to answer this question, it is essential to point out how one’s target level of risk  - which 
is referred to as the risk level with the maximum net benefit for an individual in a given 
situation (Adams, 1988; Hoyes, Stanton, & Taylor, 1996; Wilde, 1982) - comes about. As 
defined by Wilde, the target level of risk depends on an individual's evaluation of the costs 
and benefits of both safe and risky behavior (Wilde, 1982). The decision of overtaking 
another car or not overtaking it, for example, depends on the costs and benefits of overtaking 
the car, which most likely represents the more risky action, and the costs and benefits of not 
overtaking the car referred to as the safe behavior. The cost of overtaking the car could be a 
possible accident with an oncoming vehicle, whereas the benefit could be to arriving faster at 
one’s destination. The costs of not overtaking the car might be irritation and being late for an 
appointment, while the benefit might be a safe arrival at one’s destination. Based on an 
evaluation of these costs and benefits, a driver defines the target level of risk of a particular 
situation. In order to reduce the target level of risk in road traffic settings, Wilde considers the 
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implementation of rewards for drivers who have not been involved into a crash as the most 
promising option, next to rewarding other safe driving behavior, punishing risky driving 
behaviors and punishing drivers who were involved into accidents (Wilde, Robertson, & 
Pless, 2002). An example of rewarding crash-free drivers are bonuses for a certain amount of 
time of crash-free vehicle riding. With the aim to obtaining a reward for accident-free driving, 
people’s appetite for risky driving behavior is thought to be reduced and the resulting accident 
loss diminished.  
1.4.3 Accident loss statistics in support of Risk Homeostasis Theory 
As an evidence for the existence of risk homeostasis, Wilde himself puts forward the 
example of the change from left-hand driving to right-hand driving in Sweden in 1967 (Wilde, 
1998; Wilde, Robertson, & Pless, 2002). After the change, crash rates went down indicating a 
compensatory effect of the driving population for the felt increased risk level due to the 
change. After two years, though, the accident rates went ‘back to normal’ to a level which was 
approximately the same as before the change from left hand to right hand traffic. According to 
Wilde, this reflects the homeostatic character of the driving population’s long-term accident 
rate per capita. When people noticed that the traffic situation was less dangerous than they 
thought after the change from driving on the left to driving on the right (by their own 
experience or via sources such as the media), they engaged in more risky driving behavior 
because the perceived risk level did not match with their target level of risk anymore. The 
result was the relatively same accident rate per capita which Sweden had had for years before 
the change. 
While Risk Homeostasis Theory has essentially been established to explain the nature 
of road safety (Wilde, as sited by O’Neill & Williams, 1998), it may also be applicable in 
other domains. Baniela and Ríos (2010), for instance, made use of Risk Homeostasis Theory 
to explain a trend of increased shipping accidents. Since the late 1990s the amount of serious 
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incidents in the navy has considerably risen. Interestingly, it was in this time when the 
technical safety standards exceeded all past accomplishments. The noticed trend of increasing 
incidents therewith did not fit the expectation of a decreasing number of incidents due to a 
more secure environment. Although their analysis of more 2,584 ship incidents in 2005 and 
2006 did not yield a significant result for compensatory effects as expressed by Risk 
Homeostasis Theory, Baniela and Ríos (2010) stressed the importance of the target level of 
risk concerning incidents. In light of the fact that the acceptance level of risk in ship operation 
is typically high due to economic reasons, increased perceived safety standards may quickly 
exceed the targeted risk level of ship operators. Baniela and Ríos (2010) state that higher risk 
is being equated with higher profit in the shipping domain. Consequently, the benefits of risky 
behavior may easily overrule the costs of risky operating as well as both the benefits and costs 
of safe operating. This is in agreement with Risk Homeostasis Theory’ s claim that risk 
elimination is not desired, but that risk optimization is being aimed for. However, the lack of 
empirical support of this study for Risk Homeostasis Theory is also likely to raise critics of 
Risk Homeostasis Theory.  
1.4.4 Criticism on Risk Homeostasis Theory 
From his review of accident data, Evans (1986) concludes that Risk Homeostasis 
Theory is to be refused since there is no persuasive support for it and a lot of evidence against 
it. In the United States, for example, half of the states abolished laws in the late 1970s which 
demanded motorcyclists to wear helmets. As predicted by Risk Homeostasis Theory, the 
repealing of the law in half of the states should have had lowered the accident rates shortly 
after the change. After a while the accident rates should have found back to their level before 
the law change. In the states where no law change was implemented, the accident rates per 
capita should have stayed approximately the same. According to the data, however, the states 
which repealed the law featured a 28% increase in motorcyclist fatalities compared to the 
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states without the law change.  This reflects exactly the opposite as what Risk Homeostasis 
Theory holds. Evans (1986) additionally questions the use of data on the effectiveness of 
mandatory seat belt laws to explain Risk Homeostasis Theory. In his eyes, no conclusions can 
be drawn of these data due to the possibility of phenomena such as selective recruitment. That 
is, the introduction of mandatory seat belt laws may not decrease the number of accident rates 
per capita because mostly safer drivers are effectively sticking to these laws. Besides, Evans 
(1986) did not find support for the homeostatic effect which presumes that accident rates per 
capita should remain nearly the same over time. In Japan, for instance, the rate dropped from 
1966 to 1982. His review did also not confirm Wilde’s claim that the accident rates per capita 
over time are independent of the different road types. Instead, the data indicated differences in 
the rates between rural and urban regions. 
Trimpop (1996) stresses the fact that the compensation measures can differ based on 
time and experimental settings what makes testing Risk Homeostasis Theory difficult. In his 
paper on traffic accident risk, Haight (1986) points out that Risk Homeostasis Theory cannot 
be tested as it lacks a clear definition of stable measures of compensation. Glendon, Hoyes, 
Haigney and Taylor (1996) do as well address the issue that Risk Homeostasis Theory does 
not specify what means of compensation are. However, they state that simulated 
environments may offer the opportunity to define such compensation measures via 
indentifying them and then controlling them. In this way, the mechanisms of homeostatic 
effects could possibly be revealed. Besides, Glendon et al. (1996) note that simulation studies 
allow to relate compensatory or homeostatic outcomes to psychological variables such as 
personality traits what may in turn reveal individual differences involved in homeostatic 
processes. 
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1.5 Current study’s hypotheses 
Given a long and ongoing debate about Risk Homeostasis Theory as well about 
personality traits as possible determinants of risk taking behavior, the current study aims to 
widen the present angle of view in these fields. In order to test whether people do indeed 
engage in more risky behavior the higher their perceived level of risk is, a videogame was 
being used in which a varying number of protection shields represented the perceived level of 
risk. Compensation measures which could be applied by participants in the videogame were 
speed and distance. 
1.5.2 Gender 
Following up upon preservative findings of gender as a determinant of risk-taking 
behavior (Montgomery et al., 2014; Turner & McClure, 2003), gender is expected to serve as 
a predictor of the measures of risk behavior in the videogame with women being generally 
more risk averse than men. 
1.5.3 Birth order 
Furthermore, a significant difference on the measures of risk behavior in the 
videogame between first-borns and both second- and later-borns is expected to be found. 
Taking the findings of Argys et al. (2006) into account, it is hypothesized that later-borns are 
more risk prone than second-borns, whereas second-borns are thought to be more risk prone 
than first-borns. 
1.5.4 Personality traits 
With respect to personality traits, it is presumed that they have a significant effect on 
the measures of risk behavior. Based on the findings of Anitei et al. (2014) it is presumed that 
neuroticism is positively correlated with the measures of risk behavior, whereas 
conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience are hypothesized to be 
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negatively correlated with the measures of risk behavior. Furthermore, the assumption of 
Anitei et al. (2014) of extraversion being positively related to risk behavior which was not 
supported by their own findings, is being investigated. Besides, highly impulsive participants 
are expected to be high risk takers. After all, personality traits are thought to have a predictive 
character on risk behavior. 
1.5.1 Compensatory and homeostatic effects 
Compensatory effects are thought to be identified whenever participants adjust their 
speed or distance according to a change in the number of protection shields. Also an adjusted 
Time to Collision (TTC) due to a change in the number of shields is viewed as a 
compensatory effect. It is expected that a higher number of shields comes with higher speed, 
shorter TTC and shorter distance to the closest meteor as compared to a lower number of 
shields.  
 A homeostatic effect is thought to manifest itself in a varying time played during the 
first round of the game, whereas in the fifth and last round of the game a rather stable value is 
presumed to be held by participants. In connection with that, possible interaction-effects of 
gender, birth-order and personality traits on a potential homeostatic effect are being analyzed. 
The hypotheses are being tested with the help of a self-developed videogame as well 
as with the Big Five Inventory and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). 
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2 Methods 
2.1 Participants
Participants in the study were 178 people between 18 and 57 years old (M = 22.42 
years, SD = 4.71). The majority of participants consisted of Dutch students. Before the testing 
phase, participants were asked to sign a declaration of consent for being allowed to taking part 
in the study. 
Five participants were excluded from the sample because the results from the 
questionnaires were missing completely, most probably due to a computer error. Another two 
participants were ruled out because they did not follow the correct order of the experiment. 
Two more participants were eliminated from the sample due to reported technical problems 
with the videogame. Since the declaration of consent was missing in two cases, those two 
participants were excluded, too. Accordingly, the final sample compromised 167 participants 
between 18 and 57 years old (125 women and 42 men, M = 22.48 years, SD = 4.76).  
All participants received either 2 credits or 6,50 Euro, and a snack for attending the 
study. Besides, the winner of the Spaceship Game with the highest overall score was awarded 
with a prize worth 25 Euro. The winner could choose between either receiving 25 Euro in 
cash or lottery tickets of the same value. 
2.2 Procedure
Participants were tested individually for respectively about 60 minutes by two or three 
trained experimenters on one of altogether three testing days. They first completed questions 
indicating their age, gender, as well as their birth order followed by some questions about 
their eating behavior. Subsequently, participants filled in the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking 
Scale and were asked to estimate various aspects of their risk-taking behavior in an upcoming 
videogame. As a next task, the Positive And Negative Affect Scale was conducted before our 
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self-developed Spaceship Game was played. After that, participants rated their exhibited risk-
taking behavior during the videogame. In the remaining  part of the testing phase, participants 
were presented with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, the Big Five Inventory, the Eyseneck 
Personality Questionnaire, and some concluding questions about their gaming experience and 
self-efficacy. 
Previous to the testing phase, participants received a collective introduction in English 
by one experimenter, which can be found in the Appendix. This included both oral 
instructions on the testing procedure and a simplified oral explanation of the videogame. The 
content of this introduction was simultaneously presented to participants by a PowerPoint 
slide projected onto the wall which remained visible during the whole testing phase. The 
videogame was initiated with a short exercise trial so that participants could get a feeling of 
the different speed options and the game in general. 
All tasks were conducted digitally on mainstream computer devices and took place in 
a computer room at the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences of Leiden University. The 
questions and questionnaires were provided online by making use of the Online Survey 
Software Qualtrics. All questions were in English with some rather rare or outdated 
expressions having a Dutch translation in brackets behind. In order to guarantee privacy and 
to minimize possible distractions during the testing phase, there was always one computer 
workstation left empty between participants. 
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1 Big Five Inventory
All participants completed the Big Five Inventory to identify their prevailing 
personality traits (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). The Big 
Five Inventory knows five different dimensions of personality which are extraversion versus 
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introversion, agreeableness versus antagonism, conscientiousness versus lack of direction, 
neuroticism versus emotional stability and openness versus closedness to experience. 
Participants were using a five-point rating scale to assess which personality characteristics 
reflected in 44 items applied to them.  
2.3.2 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
With the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale the behavioral construct of impulsiveness was 
assessed (Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995; Stanford et al., 2009). With the help of a four-
point rating scale participants had to indicate on altogether 30 items how often they engage in 
certain thoughts or actions. The questionnaire distinguishes between attention, cognitive 
instability, motor, perseverance, self-control and cognitive complexity as first order factors. 
The more general second order factors are attentional impulsiveness which is made up of 
attention and cognitive instability, motor impulsiveness which compromises motor and 
perseverance, and non-planning impulsiveness which consists of self-control and cognitive 
complexity.  
2.3.3 Birth order
Birth order was assessed by asking people whether they were the first-born, second-
born or whether they were later born in the birth order. Later-born in the birth order meant 
that they had two or more than two older siblings.
2.3.4 Spaceship Game
The self-developed Spaceship Game was used as a tool to measure the level of risk-
taking behavior. Participants had to navigate a spaceship by moving it in vertical direction 
through a number of oncoming meteors without hitting them. The faster they went, the more 
points they received per second (The calculation method for the scores can be found in the 
Appendix.). The vertical movement of the spaceship was accomplished by pressing the up or 
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down arrow key, whereas the speed was controlled by pressing the right arrow key to go 
faster and the left arrow key to go slower. Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the spaceship game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Screenshot of the spaceship game. 
Participants could choose between 13 different speed levels which depicted the game's 
diverse difficulty levels. The lowest speed level which represented the standard starting speed 
level of each game was set at 320 pixels per second. Every increase in difficulty resulted in an 
increase of speed of 50 pixels per second. The maximum speed at speed level 13 was 
accordingly 920 pixels per second. Whereas it seemed to the participants as if the speed level 
did affect the spaceship itself, it was actually the meteors it affected. The spaceship could just 
be moved in vertical direction. When the speed level was changed in fact the pace of the 
meteors flying into the screen was changed. Due to the fact that the background was moving, 
too, it seemed as if the spaceship was accelerated and decelerated, and not the meteors. 
Whenever participants collided with a meteor, the spaceship lost one protection shield 
and could shortly not be accelerated or decelerated, before another flight began. When one 
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game was over, the spaceship was set back to its original starting position in the middle of the 
screen so that another game could start. 
The overall five test trials had a varying number of protection shields: there was a 
zero-shield condition, a one-shield condition, a three-shield condition, a five-shield condition 
as well as a condition in which the amount of shields was unknown to the participants (the 
unknown-shield condition comprised three shields). This variety in number of shields 
confronted participants with a varying level of actual or perceived risk. The sequence of the 
diverse shield conditions was randomly mixed among participants. Except for the unknown-
shield condition, the number of shields was permanently displayed in the top left corner of the 
screen. The speed level, the number of gained points and the timer, in contrast, were never 
displayed in order to minimize any possible distractions for participants. The density of 
meteors invading from the right side of the screen was the same at every point on the vertical 
axis. In this way, it was ensured that navigating the spaceship at the bottom or at the top of the 
screen did not result in a lower chance of getting hit by a meteor. 
The test trials were preceded by one exercise trial with either one or three protection 
shields. The two different shield conditions within the exercise trial were randomized among 
participants. During the exercise trial also only the number of shields was displayed what 
served as a feedback to participants' performance in the game. When participants managed to 
navigate the spaceship through the clouds of meteors without getting hit each trial ended after 
four minutes at the most, what defined a maximum duration of the whole videogame of 24 
minutes. 
The speed level as well as Time to Collision (TTC) and the distance kept to the closest 
meteor were consulted as indicators for the amount of risk people were taking during the 
Spaceship Game. TTC is a measure which specifies the time until the spaceship would collide 
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with a meteor if the participant does not change the vertical direction of the spaceship or the 
speed (Montgomery et al., 2014). The higher the risk-taking behavior of the participants, the 
higher the speed level, the shorter the TTC and the shorter the distance kept to the closest 
meteor.  
2.4 Data Management
All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 21. The data from the research 
participants on all variables were not complete. Missing data were not missing at random but 
occurred whenever participants managed to not lose (all of their) protection shields until one 
shield condition was over. Altogether, in 57 cases data from one or more variable were 
missing. 
The data from the videogame were perceived by measuring 100 times per second the 
current position of the spaceship on the y-axis, the current position of the meteor closest to the 
spaceship on both the x- and y-axis,  the current difficulty level, as well as the collision 
moments between the spaceship and meteors. Next to those parameters, the number of shields 
was logged as well as the time played by each participant per shield condition. The obtained 
data were used to calculate the risk parameters speed, TTC and distance kept to the closest 
meteor. The methods of calculations for each of the risk parameters can be found in the 
Appendix. Speed was measured in pixels per second, TTC in seconds and distance to closest 
meteor in pixels. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Gender and measures of risk behavior 
3.1.1 Gender and average speed 
Regarding the average speed in all shield conditions of the videogame, men (M = 
571.71, SD = 125.20) seemed to have gone faster than women (M = 485.29, SD = 114.11). An 
independent t-test on the grand mean of speed as dependent variable and gender as 
independent variable confirmed that men were significantly faster than women, t(165) = 4.14, 
p < .001. Figure 4 displays the difference in average speed measured in pixels per second 
between men and women in all five shield conditions. 
 
 Figure 4. Effect of gender on average speed in all shield conditions. 
 
3.1.2 Gender and average TTC 
Moreover, men (M = .94, SD = .23) seemed to have a shorter average TTC in all shield 
conditions than woman (M = 1.07, SD = .22), as can be seen from Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Effect of gender on average TTC in all shield conditions. 
 
To test whether this difference is significant, another independent t-test on the grand 
mean of  TTC as dependent variable and gender as independent variable was conducted. The 
test verified that men did have a shorter TTC than women, t(165) = -3.31, p = .001. 
3.1.3 Gender and average distance to closest meteor 
For the risk parameter average distance kept to the closest meteor in all shield 
conditions, though, no difference was found between men (M = 161.06, SD = 9.14) and 
women (M = 163.02, SD = 7.58) in an independent t-test, t(165) = -1.38, p = .17. Figure 6 
displays the effect of gender on the average distance kept to the closest meteor in all five 
shield conditions. 
 
Figure 6. Effect of gender on average distance to closest meteor in all shield conditions. 
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3.2 Birth order and measures of risk behavior 
Descriptive statistics for the measures of speed, TTC and distance kept to the closest 
meteor in all five shield conditions, as well as for time played in the first and fifth round of 
the game measured in seconds, the Big Five Inventory and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale are 
presented in Table 1. 
First-borns (n  = 86) Second-borns (n  = 52) Two or more siblings (n  = 29)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Speed 511.40 (132.36) 496.77 (113.87) 512.44 (109.16)
TTC 1.03 (.23) 1.05 (.22) 1.02 (.24)
Distance to clostest meteor 162.14 (8.48) 162.94 (7.00) 162.95 (8.54)
Time played in first round of game 103.89 (82.19) 111.09 (79.39) 111.10 (93.15)
Time played in fifth round of game 82.41 (75.33) 118.49 (88.74) 120.51 (96.71)
BFI Extraversion 3.25 (.86) 3.42 (.69) 3.44 (.78)
BFI Agreeableness 3.67 (.59) 3.78 (.60) 3.71 (.60)
BFI Conscientiousness 3.36 (.73) 3.41 (.67) 3.20 (.60)
BFI Neuroticism 3.01 (.73) 3.04 (.70) 2.98 (.82)
BFI Openness 3.74 (.59) 3.66 (.58) 3.71 (.57)
BIS Attenional Impulsiveness (2nd) 2.14 (.41) 2.16 (.42) 2.12 (.53)
BIS Attention (1st) 2.04 (.46) 2.09 (.50) 2.02 (.54)
BIS Cognitive Instability (1st) 2.31 (.51) 2.28 (.53) 2.29 (.67)
BIS Motor Impulsiveness (2nd) 1.99 (.36) 2.01 (.38) 2.02 (.42)
BIS Motor (1st) 2.09 (.49) 2.10 (.50) 2.12 (.55)
BIS Preseverance (1st) 1.83 (.36) 1.85 (.34) 1.84 (.43)
BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness (2nd) 2.26 (.40) 2.22 (.42) 2.31 (.43)
BIS Self-control (1st) 2.27 (.56) 2.20 (.54) 2.39 (.57)
BIS Cognitive Complexity (1st) 2.25 (.41) 2.25 (.42) 2.22 (.43)
Note.  TTC: Time to Collision; BFI: Big Five Inventory; BIS: Barratt Impulsivness Scale; 1st: First order factors;
2nd: Second order factors.
Tabel 1. Descriptive statistics for the measures of speed, Time to Collision, distance to clostest meteor, time played in the 
first and fifth round of the videogame, Big Five Inventory and Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
 
3.2.1 Birth order and average speed 
As can be seen from Table 1, first-borns seemed to have gone on a higher average 
speed in all shield conditions than second-borns. However, an independent t-test with the 
grand mean of speed as dependent variable and birth order (first-borns and second-borns) as 
independent variable revealed no significant difference between first- and second-borns, 
t(136) = .66, p = .51. In a similar manner, it was found that first-borns and later-borns with 
two or more siblings did not significantly differ on average speed, t(113) = -.04, p = .97, and 
neither did  second-borns and later-borns, t(79) = -.60, p = .55. Therefore, the three birth order 
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groups could not be distinguished from each other on the basis of average speed applied in all 
shield conditions. A graphical representation of the average speed in all the five shield 
conditions among first-borns, second-borns and later-borns is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Effect of birth-order on average speed in all shield conditions. 
 
3.2.2 Birth order and average TTC 
With respect to the average TTC in all shield conditions, first-borns and second-borns 
featured nearly the same means. An independent t-test with the grand mean of TTC as 
dependent variable and birth order (first-borns and second-borns) as independent variable 
affirmed that there is no significant difference between first- and second-borns concerning 
average TTC, t(136) = -.53, p = .60. First-borns and later-borns seemed to have quite the same 
TTC, too. An independent t-test yielded that first-borns and later-borns did indeed not differ 
on average TTC, , t(113) = .12, p = .91. Finally, also second-borns and later-borns were 
compared to each other regarding average TTC. An independent t-test revealed no significant 
difference between the two groups, t(79) = .52, p = .61. Figure 8 gives an overview of the 
average speed among the three different birth order groups. 
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Figure 8. Effect of birth order on average TTC in all shield conditions. 
 
3.2.3 Birth order and average distance to closest meteor 
When comparing the means of first-borns and second-borns on the average distance 
kept to the closest meteor in all shield conditions, there seemed to be almost no difference. An 
independent t-test with the grand mean of distance kept to the closest meteor as dependent 
variable and birth order (first-borns and second-borns) as independent variable confirmed that 
first- and second-borns did not significantly differ on the distance kept to the closest meteor, 
t(136) = -.58, p = .57. Also between first-borns and later-borns with two or more siblings an 
independent t-test did not find any significant difference, t(113) = -.45, p = .67. The same 
applied for second-borns when compared to later-borns on the average distance kept to the 
closest meteor, t(79) = -.01, p = 1.00. Figure 9 depicts the average distance kept to the closest 
meteor in all shield conditions per birth order group. 
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Figure 9. Effect of birth order on average distance kept to the closest meteor in all shield 
conditions. 
3.3 Personality traits and measures of risk behavior 
3.3.1 Big Five Inventory personality dimensions  
For the personality traits of the Big Five Inventory, five percentile groups were 
generated with the aim to find out whether there were significant differences between higher 
and lower scoring participants on the measures of risk behavior. In Table 2, descriptive 
statistics for the five percentile groups on the various personality dimensions can be found. 
Table 2. Mean scores on the Big Five personality traits grouped by five percentiles
Five percentile groups 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
BFI Extraversion 2.15 (.36) 2.84 (.18) 3.38 (.11) 3.76 (.10) 4.41 (.28)
BFI Agreeableness 2.84 (.45) 3.44 (.10) 3.73 (.06) 3.98 (.09) 4.47 (.22)
BFI Conscientiousness 2.40 (.29) 3.01 (.10) 3.33 (.09) 3.73 (.12) 4.31 (.26)
BFI Neuroticism 2.01 (.26) 2.59 (.12) 3.01 (.11) 3.42 (.15) 4.08 (.32)
BFI Openness 2.83 (.24) 3.38 (.12) 3.71 (.08) 4.04 (.12) 4.51 (.58)
Note.  BFI: Big Five Inventory.  
3.3.1.1 BFI percentiles and average speed 
To find out whether the average speed differed between the five BFI extraversion 
percentiles, a one-way ANOVA was performed with the grand mean of speed as dependent 
variable and the BFI extraversion percentiles as independent variable. This analysis yielded 
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no significant effect of the BFI extraversion percentiles on average speed, F(4,162) = 1.34, p 
= .26, ηp
2
 = .03. Another one-way ANOVA was carried out to analyze whether speed differed 
among the BFI agreeableness percentiles, with the grand mean of speed as dependent variable 
and the BFI agreeableness percentiles as independent variable. No significant effect of the 
BFI agreeableness percentiles on average speed was found, F(4,162) = .52, p = .72, ηp
2
 = .13. 
The same applied for the BFI conscientiousness percentiles (F(4,162) = 1.28, p = .28, ηp
2
 = 
.03), the BFI neuroticism percentiles (F(4,162) = 1.07, p = .37, ηp
2
 = .03) and the BFI 
openness percentiles (F(4,162) = .23, p = .92, ηp
2
 = .01) – none of them did show a significant 
effect on average speed. To sum up, the five percentile groups of the different BFI personality 
traits did not differ on the average speed applied over all shield conditions. 
3.3.1.2 BFI percentiles and average TTC 
Furthermore, it was tested whether the average TTC differed based on the BFI 
extraversion percentiles. A one-way ANOVA with the grand mean of TTC as dependent 
variable and the BFI extraversion percentiles as independent variable was ran with the result 
that the average TTC did not differ among the five BFI extraversion percentiles, F(4,162) = 
1.16, p = .33, ηp
2
 = .03. With the same method of analysis, it was revealed that the percentile 
groups of the BFI traits agreeableness (F(4,162) = 1.31, p = .27, ηp
2
 = .03), conscientiousness 
(F(4,162) = .54, p = .70, ηp
2
 = .01), neuroticism (F(4,162) = 1.17, p = .33, ηp
2
 = .03) and 
openness (F(4,162) = .34, p = .85, ηp
2
 = .01) had no significant effect on the average TTC. 
3.3.1.3 BFI percentiles and average distance kept to the closest meteor 
To investigate whether there was a difference in the means between the BFI 
extraversion percentile groups on the distance to the closest meteor, a one-way ANOVA with 
the grand mean of distance to closest meteor as dependent variable and BFI extraversion 
percentiles as independent variable was carried out. It was found that the five BFI 
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extraversion percentile groups had no significant effect on the average distance kept to the 
closest meteor, (F(4,162) = 1.23, p = .30, ηp
2
 = .03). In the same manner, the variance on the 
average distance kept to the closest meteor of the of the other BFI personality dimension 
percentiles were tested. The result was, that the different percentile groups of the remaining 
BFI personality traits did not have a significant effect on the average distance to the closest 
meteor (agreeableness: F(4,162) = 1.40, p = .23, ηp
2
 = .03; conscientiousness: F(4,162) = .77, 
p = .54, ηp
2
 = .02; neuroticism: F(4,162) = .72, p = .58, ηp
2
 = .02; openness: F(4,162) = .37, p 
= .83, ηp
2
 = .01). 
3.3.2 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
Similarly as for the personality dimensions of the Big Five Inventory, also for the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale percentile groups were generated in order to investigate whether 
those had an effect on the measures of risk behavior. Descriptive statistics for the four 
percentile groups of the BIS first and second order factors are presented in Table 3. 
Four percentile groups 0-25 26-50 51-75 76-100
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
BIS Attentional Impulsiveness (2nd) 1.59 (.16) 2.02 (.10) 2.31 (.06) 2.68 (.23)
BIS Attention (1st) 1.45 (.16) 1.92 (.10) 2.20 (.00) 2.64 (.27)
BIS Cognitive Instability (1st) 1.56 (.16) 2.00 (.00) 2.51 (.17) 3.15 (.27)
BIS Motor Impulsiveness (2nd) 1.54 (.11) 1.81 (.08) 2.13 (.10) 2.54 (.15)
BIS Motor (1st) 1.53 (.18) 1.93 (.07) 2.26 (.12) 2.78 (.24)
BIS Preseverance (1st) 1.40 (.17) 1.75 (.00) 2.00 (.00) 2.37 (.19)
BIS Non-Planning Impusliveness (2nd) 1.71 (.17) 2.09 (.08) 2.37 (.08) 2.79 (.22)
BIS Self-control (1st) 1.61 (.22) 2.08 (.08) 2.41 (.08) 2.94 (.27)
BIS Cognitive Complexity (1st) 1.67 (.15) 2.10 (.10) 2.40 (.00) 2.77 (.20)
Note.  BSI: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; 1st: First order factors; 2nd: Second order factors.
Table 3. Mean scores on the measures of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale grouped by four
percentiles
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3.3.2.1 BIS percentiles and average speed 
With the help of a one-way ANOVA it was being tested whether the percentile groups 
of the BIS first order factor attention differed on average speed applied in all shield conditions 
of the game. The grand mean of speed was used as dependent variable, whereas the BIS 
attention percentiles were used as independent variable. This yielded no significant effect, 
though, F(3,163) = 1.17, p = .33, ηp
2
 = .02), meaning that the means of the BIS attention 
percentiles did not significantly differ on speed. Also the other BIS first order factors did not 
show a significant effect on average speed (cognitive instability: F(3,163) = .96, p = .42, ηp
2
 = 
.02; motor: F(3,163) = 2.77, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .05; perseverance: F(3,163) = .08, p = .97, ηp
2
 = 
.00; self-control: F(3,163) = .70, p = .55, ηp
2
 = .01; cognitive complexity: F(3,163) = 1.51, p = 
.21, ηp
2
 = .03). 
3.3.2.2 BIS percentiles and average TTC 
To find out whether the percentile groups of the BIS first order factors differed on the 
average TTC in all five shield conditions, additional one-way ANOVA were conducted. 
However, no significant differences between the group means of the four percentiles in the 
first order factors on average TTC were found (attention: F(3,163) = 1.08, p = . 36, ηp
2
 = . 02; 
cognitive instability: F(3,163) = 1.39, p = .25, ηp
2
 = .03; motor: F(3,163) = 2.10, p = .10, ηp
2
 = 
.04; perseverance: F(3,163) = .20, p = .90, ηp
2
 = .00; self-control: F(3,163) = 1.18, p = .32, ηp
2
 
= .02; cognitive complexity: F(3,163) = 1.56, p = .20, ηp
2
 = .03). 
3.3.2.3 BIS percentiles and average distance kept to the closest meteor  
Also with respect to distance kept to the closest meteor, it was analyzed whether the 
percentile groups of the BIS first factors had an effect. By conducting several one-way 
ANOVA with the grand mean of distance to the closest meteor as dependent variable and the 
percentile groups of the particular BIS first order factors as independent variables, it was 
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revealed that the percentile groups of the different BIS first order factors did not have a 
significant effect on the average distance to the closest meteor (attention: F(3,163) = 2.32, p = 
.08 , ηp
2
 = .04; cognitive instability: F(3,163) = .52, p = .67, ηp
2
 = .01; motor: F(3,163) = .25, 
p = .86, ηp
2
 = .01; perseverance: F(3,163) = .75, p = .53, ηp
2
 = .01; self-control: F(3,163) = 
.41, p = .75, ηp
2
 = .01; cognitive complexity: F(3,163) = 1.35, p = .26, ηp
2
 = .02). 
Due to the fact that the percentile groups of the BIS first order factors did not show 
any significant effects on the measures of risk behavior, it can be concluded that also the BIS 
second order factors did not have any effect, since they are calculated from the BIS first order 
factors. 
3.3 Effects of risk behavior, gender and personality traits 
The Pearson correlations between the average speed, average Time to Collision, 
average distance to closest meteor, average time played in first and fifth round of the game, 
gender, and the measures of the Big Five Inventory and Barratt Impulsiveness Scale are 
presented in Table 4.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Grand mean speed 1
2 Grand mean TTC -.95** 1
3 Grand mean distance to clostest meteor .06 -.00 1
4 Time played in first round of game -.29** .33** -.28** 1
5 Time played in fifth round of game -.40** .42** -.09 .31** 1
6 Gender -.31** .25** .11 -.08 -.08 1
7 BFI Extraversion -.13 .09 -.17* .08 .04 .04 1
8 BFI Agreeableness -.08 .12 -.02 -.06 .03 -.04 -.01 1
9 BFI Conscientiousness -.15* .12 -.04 -.09 -.01 .31** -.08 .28** 1
10 BFI Neuroticism -.13 .13 .11 -.04 -.08 .28** -.19* -.22** -.04 1
11 BFI Opennness -.03 .05 -.07 -.01 .02 -.08 .26** .09 -.10 .05 1
12 BIS Attenional Impulsiveness (2nd) -.04 .07 -.01 .06 .09 -.14 .13 -.23** -.57** .28** .19* 1
13 BIS Attention (1st) -.08 .09 .03 .04 .05 -.05 .06 -.28** -.58** .26** .03 .91** 1
14 BIS Cognitive Instability (1st) .04 .00 -.06 .06 .11 -.22** .18* -.07 -.36** .22** .36** .78** .45** 1
15 BIS Motor Impulsiveness (2nd) .04 -.02 .01 .12 -.03 -.24** .38** -.20** -.57** -.10 .26** .49** .43** .41** 1
16 BIS Motor (1st) .03 -.01 .02 .11 -.05 -.22** .44** -.22** -.57** -.11 .29** .48** .41** .41** .94** 1
17 BIS Preseverance (1st) .04 -.04 -.02 .08 .03 -.14 -.00 -.06 -.26** -.02 .06 .24** .22** .19* .57** .25** 1
18 BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness (2nd) -.01 .02 .10 .01 .04 -.13 .26** -.20* -.65** .09 .02 .47** .53** .22** .70** .66** .30** 1
19 BIS Self-control (1st) .03 -.02 .04 .08 .05 -.22** .32** -.21** -.66** -.16* .09 .48** .52** .24** .65** .68** .22** .91** 1
20 BIS Cognitive Complexity -.07 .08 .15 -.09 .02 .06 .06 -.09 -.36** .06 -.10 .26** .31** .09 .41** .37** .29** .73** .37** 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4. Correlations among the measures of risk behavior, time played in first and fifth round of the game, gender and personality 
traits
Note . TTC: Time to Collision; BFI: Big Five Inventory; BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; 1st: First order factors; 2nd: Second order 
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As can be seen from Table 4, gender was significantly negatively correlated with the 
grand mean of speed. This indicates that female participants had applied a slower average 
speed than men during the test trials of the videogame, what approves the assumption of 
women as the more risk averse sex. Furthermore, gender was significantly positively 
correlated with average TTC, what also confirms the assumption that women would generally 
show a higher average TTC than men. However, no significant correlation was found between 
gender and average distance kept to the closest meteor suggesting that there is no relation 
between these factors. For this reason, the assumption that gender and all measures of risk are 
correlated seemed not to be supported by the data. Therewith, neither the hypothesis of a 
predictive character of gender on all measures of risk could be accepted according to the 
current results. Only for the measures of speed and TTC gender could be a predictor. 
From the fact that the BFI personality dimension conscientiousness was significantly 
positively correlated to gender, it can be inferred that women scored higher on the BFI trait 
conscientiousness than men did. This in turn, fits to the outcome that participants scoring high 
on conscientiousness did on average have a low speed. Besides, highly extraverts seemed to 
have had a shorter distance to the closest meteor. A non significant correlation between all 
other personality traits and the measures of risk were found. Consequently, only the 
assumptions that extraversion is significantly positively related to the measures of risk, and 
conscientiousness significantly negatively correlated to the measures of risk were partly 
supported by the data. The hypotheses of relations between agreeableness, neuroticism, 
openness as well as impulsiveness and measures of risk behavior was not supported by the 
current results. 
3.4 Speed, gender, personality and birth order over all shield conditions 
Nevertheless, a linear regression analysis was conducted with the grand mean of speed 
as dependent variable and gender, personality (Big Five Inventory scores and Barratt 
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Impulsiveness scores) and birth order as independent variables. For the hierarchical regression 
see Table 5.  
Standardized
coeffcient
t F ∆  F p R² ∆ R²
Model and variables B SE (B) β
Model 1 17.16 17.16 <.001 .09 .09
   Gender 86.42 20.86 .31** 4.14
Model 2 3.94 1.27 .001 .13 .04
   Gender 72.60 23.30 .26** 3.12
   BFI Extraversion -21.48 12.18 -.14 -1.76
   BFI Agreeableness -20.75 16.50 -.10 -1.26
   BFI Consciousness -10.96 14.60 -.06 -.75
   BFI Neuroticism -18.08 13.71 -.11 -1.32
   BFI Openness -1.99 16.48 -.01 -.12
Model 3 3.05 1.23 .002 .15 .02
   Gender 70.55 23.67 .25** 2.98
   BFI Extraversion -15.84 13.05 -.10 -1.21
   BFI Agreeableness -21.38 16.59 -.10 -1.29
   BFI Consciousness -36.35 20.21 -.21 -1.80
   BFI Neuroticism -14.37 14.80 -.09 -.97
   BFI Openness -3.71 17.24 -.02 -.22
   BIS Attentional Impulsiveness -32.44 28.47 -.12 -1.14
   BIS Motor Impulsiveness 9.80 37.91 .03 .26
   BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness -44.11 34.57 -.15 -1.28
Model 4 2.48 .08 .007 .15 .001
   Gender 70.83 23.92 .25** 2.96
   BFI Extraversion -15.09 13.26 -.10 -1.14
   BFI Agreeableness -20.75 16.79 -.10 -1.24
   BFI Consciousness -36.84 20.44 -.21 -1.80
   BFI Neuroticism -14.02 14.91 -.08 -.94
   BFI Openness -4.50 17.50 -.02 -.26
   BIS Attentional Impulsiveness -32.62 28.80 -.12 -1.13
   BIS Motor Impulsiveness 10.25 38.33 .03 .27
   BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness -45.07 34.99 -.15 -1.29
   First-born relative to third-born 7.66 25.54 .03 .30
   Second-born relative to third-born .77 27.67 .003 .03
*p  < .05; **p  < .01
Unstandardized
coefficient
Table 5. Hierarchical regression of speed on gender, measures of personality and birth order
Note.  BFI: Big Five Inventory; BIS: Barratt Impulsivness Scale.
 
In model one, the effect of gender on speed was tested (F(1,165) = 17.16, p  < .001, R
2
 
= .09). Since this model only consisted of gender, gender contributed significantly to the 
prediction of speed (B = 86.42, t(165) = 4.14, p < .001). Gender explained about 9.40% of 
variation in speed. The slope of gender represents the difference between the mean of men 
and women. So men did on average speed 86.42 pixels per second more than women. Neither 
between personality - measured with the help of the Big Five Inventory and the Barratt 
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Impulsiveness Scale - and speed, nor between birth order and speed a relationship was found. 
Therefore, in the later models, neither personality nor birth order did show any improvement 
in the prediction of speed. The BFI personality trait extraversion was not significant. (BFI 
extraversion: B = -21.48, t(160) = -1.76, p = .08). Also the BFI personality trait agreeableness 
did not serve as a predictor of speed (BFI Agreeableness: B = -20.75, t(160) = -1.26, p = .21). 
The BFI personality trait conscientiousness was not significant (BFI conscientiousness: B = -
10.96, t(160) = -.75, p = .45), and neither were neuroticism (BFI neuroticism: B = -18.07, 
t(160) = -1.32, p = .19) nor openness (BFI openness: B = -1.99, t(160) = -.12, p = .90). Also 
attentional impulsiveness measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale was not significant 
(BIS attentional impulsiveness: B = -32.44, t(157) = -1.14, p = .26). The same applied to 
motor impulsiveness (BIS motor impulsiveness: B = 9.80, t(157) = .26, p = .80) and non-
planning impulsiveness (BIS non-planning impulsiveness: B = -44.11, t(157) = -1.28, p = 
.20). First-borns did not differ from later-borns regarding the grand mean of speed (first-born 
as compared to later-borns: B = 7.66, t(155) = .30, p = .77). Second-borns did not differ from 
later-borns (second-borns as compared to later-borns: B = .77, t(155) = .03, p = .98).  
The same regression analysis was additionally conducted by comparing first-borns to 
second-borns on the one hand, and later-borns to second-borns on the other hand. This 
compilation did not show any relevant differences to the first regression, though. 
3.4 TTC gender, personality and birth order over all shield conditions 
In order to find out about the predictive character of gender, personality and birth 
order on TTC, another linear regression was conducted. The grand mean of TTC over all 
shield conditions in the test trial served as the dependent variable, whereas gender, personality 
and birth order were independent variables. The results of this hierarchical regression analysis 
are depicted in Table 6. 
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Standardized
coeffcient
t F ∆  F p R ² ∆ R²
Model and variables B SE (B) β
Model 1 10.96 10.96 .001 .06 .06
   Gender -.13 .04 -.25** -3.31
Model 2 3.00 1.38 .01 .10 .04
   Gender -.11 .04 -.21* -2.50
   BFI Extraversion .02 .03 .11 1.30
   BFI Agreeableness .06 .03 .15 1.79
   BFI Consciousness .01 .03 .03 .37
   BFI Neuroticism .04 .03 .13 1.51
   BFI Openness .01 .03 .03 .35
Model 3 2.48 1.39 .01 .12 .02
   Gender -.11 .05 -.21* -2.41
   BFI Extraversion .02 .03 .06 .73
   BFI Agreeableness .06 .03 .15 1.84
   BFI Consciousness .06 .04 .19 1.61
   BFI Neuroticism .03 .03 .10 1.09
   BFI Openness .01 .03 .03 .38
   BIS Attentional Impulsiveness .07 .05 .14 1.32
   BIS Motor Impulsiveness -.01 .07 -.02 -.14
   BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness .08 .07 .14 1.19
Model 4 2.00 .03 .03 .13 .000
   Gender -.11 .05 -.21* -2.39
   BFI Extraversion .02 .03 .06 .69
   BFI Agreeableness .06 .03 .15 1.79
   BFI Consciousness .06 .04 .19 1.60
   BFI Neuroticism .03 .03 .10 1.06
   BFI Openness .01 .03 .03 .40
   BIS Attentional Impulsiveness .07 .06 .14 1.31
   BIS Motor Impulsiveness -.01 .07 -.02 -.14
   BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness .08 .07 .14 1.19
   First-born relative to third-born -.01 .05 -.02 -.18
   Second-born relative to third-born -.001 .05 -.003 -.03
*p  < .05; **p  < .01
Unstandardized
coefficient
Table 6. Hierarchical regression of Time to Collision on gender, measures of personality and birth order
Note.  BFI: Big Five Inventory; BIS: Barratt Impulsivness Scale.
 
In model one, the effect of gender on TTC was investigated (F(1,165) = 10.96, p  = 
.001 , R
2
 = .06). From the fact that model one consisted exclusively of gender, it can be 
inferred that gender is a significant predictor of TTC (B = -.13, t(165) = -3.31, p = .001) and 
explains 6.2% of its variability. Since the slope of gender represents the difference between 
the mean of men and women, women had a .13 pixels per second longer TTC than men. None 
of the variables added in later models revealed a relationship to TTC. The personality traits 
measured by the Big Five Inventory which were added in model two were not significant (BFI 
extraversion: B = .02, t(160) = .73, p = .46; BFI agreeableness: B = .06, t(160) = 1.84, p = .07;  
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BFI conscientiousness: B = .06, t(160) = 1.61, p = .11; BFI neuroticism: B = .03, t(160) = 
1.09, p = .28; BFI Openness: B = .01, t(160) = .38, p = .70). Impulsiveness measured by the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale and added in model three did also not serve as a predictor of TTC 
(BIS attentional impulsiveness: B = .07, t(157) = 1.32, p = .19; BIS motor impulsiveness: B = 
-.01, t(157) = -.14, p = .89; BIS non-planning impulsiveness: B = .08, t(157) = 1.19, p = .24). 
In the fourth model, first-borns and second-borns were compared to people with two or more 
than two siblings. With respect to TTC there was no difference between first-borns and later-
borns (B = -.01, t(155) = -.18, p = .86) and also second-borns could not be distinguished from 
later-borns on the basis of TTC (B = -.00, t(155) = -.03, p = .98). 
The same regression analysis was additionally conducted by comparing first-borns to 
second-borns on the one hand and later-borns to second-borns on the other hand. This 
compilation did not show any relevant differences to the first regression, though. 
3.5 Distance to closest meteor, gender, personality and birth order over all shield 
conditions 
With the intention to find out whether gender, personality and birth order influenced 
the distance participants kept from the closest meteor in path, a linear regression was carried 
out with distance to the closest meteor in path as dependent variable, and gender, personality 
and birth order as independent variables. Table 7 shows the hierarchical regression. 
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Standardized
coeffcient
t F ∆  F p R ² ∆ R²
Model and variables B SE (B) β
Model 1 1.90 1.90 .17 .01 .01
   Gender -1.97 1.43 -.11 -1.38
Model 2 1.57 1.50 .16 .06 .04
   Gender -2.40 1.59 -.13 -1.51
   BFI Extraversion -1.69 .83 -.17* -2.03
   BFI Agreeableness .45 1.12 .03 .40
   BFI Consciousness -1.25 1.00 -.11 -1.26
   BFI Neuroticism .56 .93 .05 .60
   BFI Openness -.49 1.12 -.04 -.43
Model 3 1.53 1.42 .14 .08 .03
   Gender -2.10 1.61 -.11 -1.30
   BFI Extraversion -2.14 .89 -.21* -2.41
   BFI Agreeableness .54 1.13 .04 .48
   BFI Consciousness -.05 1.38 -.004 -.04
   BFI Neuroticism 1.11 1.01 .10 1.10
   BFI Openness -.27 1.17 -.02 -.23
   BIS Attentional Impulsiveness -1.80 1.94 -.10 -.93
   BIS Motor Impulsiveness 1.44 2.58 .07 .56
   BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness 3.52 2.35 .18 1.50
Model 4 1.33 .47 .21 .09 .01
   Gender -2.14 1.62 -.12 -1.32
   BFI Extraversion -2.27 .90 -.23* -2.52
   BFI Agreeableness .43 1.14 .03 .38
   BFI Consciousness .03 1.39 .002 .02
   BFI Neuroticism 1.05 1.01 .10 1.04
   BFI Openness -.13 1.19 -.01 -.11
   BIS Attentional Impulsiveness -1.78 1.95 -.10 -.91
   BIS Motor Impulsiveness 1.35 2.60 .06 .52
   BIS Non-planning Impulsiveness 3.70 2.37 .19 1.56
   First-born relative to third-born -1.22 1.73 -.08 -.71
   Second-born relative to third-born -.01 1.88 .000 -.003
*p  < .05; **p  < .01
Unstandardized
coefficient
Table 7. Hierarchical regression of distance to clostest meteor on gender, measures of personality and
birth order
Note.  BFI: Big Five Inventory; BIS: Barratt Impulsivness Scale.
 
None of the models was significant suggesting that neither gender, nor personality nor 
birth order had a predictive character on the distance kept to the closest meteor in path. 
Interestingly, though, the personality trait extraversion measured by the Big Five Inventory 
was significant (B = -1.69, t(160) = -2.03, p = .04) which indicates that the higher people 
scored on extraversion the less distance they kept to the closest meteor in path. 
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The same regression analysis was additionally conducted by comparing first-borns to 
second-borns on the one hand and later-borns to second-borns on the other hand. This 
compilation did not show any relevant differences to the first regression, though. 
All in all, the results of the different regression analyses do only support the 
hypothesis that gender has a predictive character on speed and TTC. Neither birth order, nor 
personality traits did serve as predictors of risk-taking behavior according to the current 
results. 
3.6 Risk Homeostasis  
3.6.1 Compensatory effects 
3.6.1.1 The effect of shield condition on measures of risk 
With respect to possible compensatory effects, it was expected that that the higher the 
number of shields, the higher the average speed, the shorter the TTC and the shorter the 
distance kept to the closest meteor. Hence, in the shield conditions with a higher number of 
shields, the average speed was expected to be higher than in conditions with less shields, the 
TTC was thought to be shorter, and the distance to the closest meteor was likewise assumed to 
be shorter.  
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3.6.1.1.1 The effect of shield condition on average speed 
Figure 10 shows the effect of shield condition on average speed.  
 
Figure 10. Effect of shield condition on average speed (UN stands for unknown shield 
condition). 
 
The highest average speed was applied in the five-shield condition (M = 534.48, SD = 
150.22), whereas the lowest speed was applied in the zero-shield condition (M = 417.36, SD = 
95.07). A paired-samples t-test yielded that this is a significant difference, t(166) = -13.04, p < 
.001. Participants seemed to have compensated the lower risk level in the five-shield 
condition with higher speed, and the higher risk level in the zero-shield condition with lower 
speed. 
47 
 
 
 
3.6.1.1.2 The effect of shield condition on average TTC 
Figure 11 visualizes that the average TTC was longer in the lower shield conditions 
than in the higher shield conditions.  
 
Figure 11. Effect of shield condition on average TTC (UN stands for unknown shield 
condition). 
 
Participants showed the shortest TTC the five-shield condition (M = .97, SD = .29) and 
the highest TTC in the zero-shield condition (M = 1.28, SD = .24). A paired-samples t-test 
indicated that this was a significant difference, t(166) = 17.76, p < .001. Therewith, also the 
hypothesized compensatory effects regarding the average TTC were reflected in the data. 
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3.6.1.1.3 The effect of shield condition on average distance to closest meteor 
Moreover, participants likewise seemed to have compensated for the various shield 
conditions with their average distance kept to the closest meteor, as can be seen in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12. Effect of shield condition on average distance to closest meteor (UN stands for 
unknown shield condition). 
 
A shorter distance was kept in the five-shield condition (M = 156.73, SD = 9.56) than 
in the zero-shield condition (M = 192.50, SD = 44.69), which represents a significant 
difference, t(166) = 10.16, p < .001.  
3.6.1.2 The effect of shield losses on measures of risk 
By taking a closer look at the respective shield conditions, the effects of shield losses 
on average speed, average TTC and average distance to the closest meteor were analyzed.  
3.6.1.2.1 The effect of shield losses on average speed 
The following bar charts in Figure 13 give an overview of the effects of shield losses 
in the different shield conditions (excluding the zero-shield condition) on the average speed 
applied by participants.  
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Figure 13. Effect of number of shields left on average speed in one-, three-, five- and 
unknown-shield condition. 
 
All participants seemed to have kept a lower average speed at the beginning of each 
shield condition. After the first shield was lost, the average speed seemed to have increased. 
In the one-, three-, five- and unknown-shield condition, the difference in average speed 
between the full amount of shields and the loss of the first shield was significant, as various 
paired-samples t-tests revealed (one-shield condition: t(162) = -10.16, p < .001; three-shield 
condition: t(163) = -11.61, p < .001; five-shield condition: t(163) = -12.08, p < .001; 
unknown-shield condition: t(162) = -11.46, p < .001). This stands in contrast to the 
hypothesized lower speed applied with the loss of shields. Participants seemed not to have 
compensated for the shield loss with a lower speed. 
50 
 
 
 
Besides, the average speed after the first shield was lost seemed to have remained 
nearly the same in the three-, five- and unknown-shield condition. In order to find out whether 
these observations were supported by the data, additional paired-samples t-tests were 
conducted. In the three-shield condition, it was found that the average speed with two shields 
left (M = 534.35, SD = 171.67) did not differ significantly from the average speed applied 
when there was only one shield left (M = 540.36, SD = 172.33), t(155) = -1.06, p = .29). The 
average speed applied with one shield left (M = 549.80, SD = 173.15) did also not 
significantly differ from the speed applied when there was no shield left anymore (M = 
553.17, SD = 169.52), t(165) = -.61, p = .55. In the five-shield condition, there was a 
significant difference in speed between four shields left (M = 555.49, SD = 175.46) and three 
shields left (M = 567.64, SD = 175.52), t(159) = -2.01, p < .05. Between three shields left (M 
= 577.55, SD = 176.21) and two shields left (M = 572.85, SD = 165.71), there was no 
significant difference, t(148) = .82, p = .42, and neither was between two shields left (M = 
581.51, SD = 166.52) and one shield left (M = 578.84, SD = 171.27), t(139) = .46, p = .65, nor 
between one shield left (M = 589.00, SD = 170.74) and no shield left (M = 587.15, SD = 
173.02), t(129) = .40, p = .69. In the unknown-shield condition, there was a significant 
difference in average speed between two shields left (M = 523.13, SD = 158.57) and one 
shield left (M = 550.23, SD = 164.17), t(146) = -4.01, p < .001. Between one shield left (M = 
558.92, SD = 163.41) and zero shields left (M = 570.49, SD = 174.20), there was also a 
significant difference, t(138) = -2.17, p < .05. To sum up, from the results it can not be 
concluded that participants applied a constant speed in the three-, five- and unknown- shield 
condition after the first shield was lost. 
3.6.1.2.2 The effect of shield losses on average TTC 
Figure 14 displays the effects of shield losses in the various shield conditions 
(excluding the zero-shield condition) on the average TTC.  
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Figure 14. Effect of number of shields left on average TTC in one-, three-, five- and        
unknown-shield condition. 
 
As can be inferred from the bar charts, TTC seemed to have been longer at the 
beginning of each shield condition than in the further course when shields were lost. With the 
help of a number of paired-samples t-tests it was analyzed whether this was indeed the case. 
In the one-shield condition, as well as in the three-, five- and unknown-shield condition, the 
average TTC did significantly differ between the full amount of shields and the first loss of a 
shield (one-shield condition: t(162) = 12.57, p < .001; three-shield condition: t(163) = 13.61, 
p < .001; five-shield condition: t(163) = 15.14, p < .001; unknown-shield condition: t(162) = 
13.11, p < .001). This finding does not support the assumption that participants would 
compensate for shield losses with a longer TTC. 
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Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 14, in the three-, five- and unknown-shield 
conditions TTC seemed to have stayed nearly constant after the first shield was lost. Paired-
samples t-tests for the three-shield condition yielded that between two shields left (M = .94, 
SD = .35) and one shield left (M = .91, SD = .34) there was indeed no significant difference in 
average TTC, t(155) = 1.04, p = .30, and neither was between one shield left (M = .89, SD = 
.32) and zero shields left (M = .89, SD = .35), t(145) = -.30, p = .77. In the five-shield 
condition, there was also no significant difference in average TTC between four shields left 
(M = .91, SD = .34) and three shields left (M = .88, SD = .34), t(159) = 1.35, p = .18. Between 
three shields left (M = .86, SD = .33) and two shields left (M = .88, SD = .33) there was no 
significant difference, t(148) = -1.08, p = .28, and neither was between two shields left (M = 
.86, SD = .33) and one shield left (M = .86, SD = .33), t(139) = .40, p = .70, nor between one 
shield left (M = .83, SD = .31) and zero shields left (M = .81, SD = .33), t(129) = .97, p = .33. 
In the unknown-shield condition, however, a significant difference between the average TTC 
with two shields left (M = .96, SD = .34) and one shield left (M = .90, SD = .34) was found, 
t(146) = 2.58, p < .05. Between one shield left (M = .87, SD = .33) and zero shields left (M = 
.87, SD = .03), no significant difference on average TTC was being detected, t(138) = .20, p = 
.84. So all in all, it can be said that the average TTC after the first shield had been lost, was 
nearly the same in the three-, five- and unknown-shield condition. 
3.6.1.2.3 The effect of shield losses on average distance to closest meteor 
Similar findings as for the average speed and average TTC, were found for the average 
distance to the closest meteor. In Figure 15 the effect of number of shields on average 
distance to the closest meteor in the one-, three-, five- and unknown-shield condition are 
depicted.  
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Figure 15. Effect of number of shields left on average distance to closest meteor in one-,  
three-, five- and unknown-shield condition. 
 
At the beginning of the shield conditions, participants seemed to have kept a further 
distance to the closest meteor than after shields were lost. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that 
this was indeed the case (one shield condition: t(162) = 11.64, p < .001; three shield 
condition: t(163) = 12.35, p < .001; five shield condition: t(163) = 11.79, p < .001; unknown 
shield condition: t(162) = 11.61, p < .001). 
From the three-, five- and unknown-shield conditions it can be seen that the distance 
kept to the closest meteor seemed to have stayed nearly constant after the first shield was lost. 
In order to test this, several paired-samples t-tests were conducted. In the three-shield 
condition there was no significant difference between two shields left (M = 148.08, SD = 
17.89) and one shield left (M = 149.09, SD = 14.75), t(155) = -.63, p = .53). Between one 
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shield left (M = 148.61, SD = 15.05) and zero shields left (M = 145.91, SD = 21.40) no 
significant difference of average distance was found either, t(145) = 1.53, p = .13). In the five-
shield condition no difference between four shields left (M = 149.22, SD = 19.18) and three 
shields left (M = 148.44, SD = 18.68) was found on average distance, t(159) = .38, p = .70), 
and neither between three shields left (M = 147.91, SD = 19.18) and two shields left (M = 
150.14, SD = 14.60), t(148) = -1.30, p = .20, nor between two shields left (M = 150.09, SD = 
14.95) and one shield left (M = 147.89, SD = 18.99), t(139) = 1.15, p = .25. Also between one 
shield left (M = 147.36, SD = 19.49) and zero shields left (M = 146.14, SD = 21.51) no 
significant difference was revealed, t(129) = .50, p = .62. In the unknown-shield condition a 
paired-samples t-test did not yield a significant difference between two shields left (M = 
147.42, SD = 20.27) and one shield left (M = 148.06, SD = 19.97), t(146) = -.28, p = .78. 
Likewise, between one shield left (M = 147.68, SD = 20.40) and zero shields left (M = 149.32, 
SD = 18.53) no significant difference came across, t(138) = -.75, p = .45. So after the first 
shield was lost in the three-, five- and unknown-shield condition the average distance to the 
closest meteor stayed the same. 
3.6.2 Homeostasis effect 
A homeostatic effect as described by Wilde is assumed to be reflected in participants 
differing in the time played during the first game, but converging to a common value of time 
played in the last game. Time played has been determined as a relevant variable for a possible 
homeostatic effect because it is assumed to reflect participants’ accomplishment to stay alive 
as long as possible in order to become the winner of the game. The accomplishment to stay 
alive is assumed to vary in the beginning as an effect of adjustment actions participants are 
expected to take according to the respective shield condition they face in the first game. In the 
course of the game, however, participants are thought to approximate each other in their 
accomplishment to stay alive - independent of the shield condition they face - resulting in a 
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common value of time played by the end of the fifth game. For the homeostatic model relating 
time played to the gaming behavior see the Appendix. 
With the aim to assess whether a risk homeostasis effect had occurred or not, two new 
variables were computed in SPSS. The first variable contains information about the time 
played by every participant during the first game. Since the order in which participants played 
the five different shield conditions was randomized, participants did not all start with the same 
shield condition as a first game. The new variable therefore compromises the time played by 
participants in all five various shield conditions during the first space ship game. The same 
was done for the fifth game which was the last game participants played. So the second 
variable comprises the time played by participants in all the five different shield conditions 
during the last space ship game. 
In order to see whether a homeostasis effect was present, the standard deviations of 
time in first game played and time in fifth game played were compared to each other. A 
homeostatic effect was thought to be present when the standard deviation in time played was 
larger in the first game than the standard deviation in time played in the fifth game. 
Descriptive statistics revealed that the time played in the first game (M = 107.38, SD = 82.90) 
had a smaller standard deviation than in the fifth game (M= 100.26, SD = 85.11). Therewith, 
no homeostatic effect had occurred in the current data set. 
To find out whether men and women as well as first-borns, second-borns and later-
borns differed on the time played in the first and the fifth game, a MANOVA was conducted. 
The times played in the first and fifth game were defined as dependent variables, and gender 
and birth order were defined as fixed factors. 
Using Wilks’s lambda, there was no significant effect of gender on the time played in 
the first and fifth game (Ʌ = .98, F(1,161) = 1.36, p = .26). That is, men and women did not 
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differ in the time played during the first and last game. Birth order, however, did show a 
significant effect on the time played in the first and fifth game according to Wilks’s lambda 
(Ʌ = .94, F(2,161) = 2.57, p = .04). Univariate test statistics revealed that birth order did only 
significantly differ in time played during the fifth game (F(2,161) = 4.60, p = .01) and not 
during the first game (F(2,161) = .15, p = .86), what suggests a reversed homeostatic effect. 
First-borns had on average played 37.51 seconds shorter than second-borns in the fifth game 
and 52.15 seconds shorter than later-borns. Between second-borns and later-borns there was 
no significant difference in time played during the fifth game. 
The effects of the different personality traits from the Big Five Inventory and the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale on time played during the first and last game were tested with 
MANOVA, too. Therefore, new variables for the five different personality traits from the Big 
Five Inventory as well as for the three different impulsiveness characteristics from the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale were computed, so that high scoring participants could be distinguished 
from low scoring participants on the particular traits. Times played in the first and fifth game 
served as dependent variables, whereas respectively one personality trait was added to gender 
and birth order as fixed factor. 
Extraversion did not have a significant effect on the time played during the first and 
fifth game corresponding to Wilks’s lambda (Ʌ = 1.00, F(1,155) = .12, p = .89). Participants 
scoring high or low on agreeableness did also not differ in the time played (Ʌ = .99, F(1,155) 
= .77, p = .47). The same applied for conscientiousness (Ʌ = .99, F(1,155) = .60, p = .55), 
neuroticism (Ʌ = .99, F(1,155) = .48, p = .62) and openness (Ʌ = .99, F(1,155) = .77, p = 
.47). Also attentional impulsiveness did not show any effect on the time played during the 
first and last game (Ʌ = .98, F(1,155) = 1.47, p = .23), neither did motor impulsiveness (Ʌ = 
1.00, F(1,155) = .37, p = .69) nor non-planning impulsiveness (Ʌ = 1.00, F(1,155) = .26, p = 
.77). 
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4 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was on the one hand to investigate the association between 
gender, birth-order, personality traits and risk behavior. On the other hand, it was aimed to 
examine compensatory and homeostatic mechanisms as predicted by Risk Homeostasis 
Theory with the help of a self-developed videogame. In connection with that, possible 
interaction-effects with gender, birth-order and personality traits were being analyzed. 
4.1 Gender 
 Preservative findings suggesting women to be more risk averse than men 
(Montgomery et al., 2014; Turner & McClure, 2003) were partly endorsed by the current 
study. Significant differences between male and female participants with regard to speed and 
TTC were found and gender served as a predictor for both variables. Women did on average 
apply less speed in all five shield conditions and exhibited a longer TTC as compared to men. 
This may be an indication for women acting more cautious than men and would fit to the 
finding of Turner and McClure (2003) which indicates that women are likely to show lower 
risk acceptance than men. 
The longer TTC of females may also be the result of the way TTC was computed, 
though. The current calculation formula for TTC is strongly dependent on speed, since the 
denominator of the fraction solely consists of the variable speed. Lower speed therewith 
automatically results in a larger overall fraction and thus in a larger, or in other words, longer, 
TTC. From this point of view, it is not surprising that men who applied a higher average 
speed during the game than women, eventually had a shorter average TTC than women. 
The variable ‘meteor in path location x’ could additionally have contributed to the 
finding of a shorter average TTC for men. Men may on average have kept less distance from 
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the meteor in path than women. This in turn would have diminished the numerator, possibly 
resulting in a shorter TTC. 
Unlike to the presumed effects of gender on the measures of risk, male and female 
participants did not differ on the risk parameter distance to the closest meteor in the current 
study. Whether this is indeed a sign for similar risk behavior of men and women is in 
question. From the fact that men and women did not significantly differ in the time played 
during the first and last game it could be inferred that both genders had approximately the 
same crash rate with meteors. Consequently, the distance to the closest meteor would be 
similar for both sexes. On one side, it could be argued that a similar crash rate is the logical 
consequence of a similar level of risky behavior. On the other side, it could be that the crash 
rate with men came through their higher average speed – which reflects risky behavior - and 
with women through a higher level of inexperience with videogames since they on average 
accomplished nearly the same amount of crashes as men at a lower speed.  
4.2 Birth order 
 With regard to birth order, no significant difference between first-borns, second-borns 
and later-borns with two or more than two siblings on the measures of risk behavior was 
found. None of the birth order groups showed higher levels of risk than the other groups 
during the videogame. All of them featured approximately the same average speed, the same 
TTC as well as the same distance to the closest meteor. 
Interestingly, though, birth order did have an effect on the time played in the last 
game. Whereas the birth order groups did not differ from each other in the time played during 
the first game, first-borns did on average play shorter than second-borns and later-borns in the 
last game. From this finding it can be concluded, that first-borns did on average have more 
crashes and succeeded less well in navigating the spaceship through the clouds of meteors by 
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the end of the videogame. At a first glance, this may be interpreted as an indication of first-
borns engaging in more risky behavior towards the end of the game what is not in accordance 
with the prediction that first-borns are the most risk averse birth order group. Due to the fact 
that birth order groups did on average not differ on the measures of risk behavior during the 
whole videogame, there seems to be no justification for this explanation, though. Another 
possible interpretation therefore is that first-borns may have had waning patience by the end 
of the videogame in comparison to second- and later-borns. During their first years of life, 
first-borns may have had the undivided attention of their parents whereas second- and later-
borns may have rather had to learn to wait before it is their turn (Argys et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, first-borns may in general be less patient than younger siblings, possibly 
resulting in a higher crash rate with meteors and a shorter time played at the end of the 
videogame. 
4.3 Personality traits 
When it comes to personality traits and risk behavior, most of the hypothesized effects 
were not supported by the current study. Only conscientiousness was negatively related to 
speed and extraversion was negatively related to distance to the closest meteor. The other 
personality traits neuroticism, agreeableness, openness to experience and impulsiveness were 
not related to the risk measures. Although conscientiousness and extraversion were partly 
related to the risk measures, they did not have a predictive character on risk behavior, as 
expected. 
 Why most of the presumed effects of personality traits on risk behavior were not 
supported by the data may have several reasons. One of them may be that personality traits 
are thought to be not completely developed until around the age of 30 (McCrae, & Costa, 
1995). Given that the current sample was mainly composed of students younger than 25, it 
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may be that the BFI and BIS did not reveal more significant results because the personality 
traits under investigation have not yet been fully formed with the majority of participants. 
 Next to that, participants may have been unfamiliar with expressions or words in the 
questionnaires. This in turn, may have led them to give inapplicable answers. Although some 
of the rather outdated expressions had a Dutch translation written behind it, other expressions 
which were understood by the researchers and therefore not provided with a Dutch translation 
may have caused problems in understanding the meaning of the statements. As a result, the 
prevailing personality traits may have not been sufficiently identified. 
 Finally, personality traits may be expressed differently from person to person (Brody, 
1994 as sited by McCrae, & Costa, 1995). While some extraverts might reveal risky behavior 
in a videogame, others may not. Not every extravert expresses extraversion in the same way. 
Accordingly, also the domain may play a role. Some extraverts may for example express the 
personality trait in a noticeable way in sports, but not in the domain of videogames. 
4.4 Compensatory effects 
As predicted by Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1982), compensatory effects were 
expected whenever the amount of projection shields changed in the course of the videogame. 
A higher number of projection shields was presumed to lead to more risky ways of steering 
the spaceship through the meteors, whereas less projection shields were thought to feature 
more cautious game playing behavior. Risky game playing actions manifested itself in high 
speed and a small distance to the meteors. Moreover, a short TTC was seen as risky behavior, 
too. 
The data of the current study are partly in support of compensatory effects. From the 
perspective of the different shield conditions it can be seen that in the shield condition with 
the highest amount of shields, participants on average showed the most risky behavior. In the 
61 
 
 
 
five-shield condition, participants applied the highest speed, the  shortest TTC and the 
smallest distance to the closest meteor as compared to all other shield conditions. The zero-
shield condition, in contrast, revealed the lowest values of risk measures as compared to all 
other shield conditions. Participants chose for the overall slowest speed, the longest TTC and 
the largest distance to the closest meteor. 
The effects of shield losses on the measures of risk found in the current study, 
however, were not in accordance with the expected compensatory effects. Participants seemed 
to apply the lowest speed at the start of each shield condition. That is, when they still had all 
the shields in the one-, three-, five- and unknown-shield condition, the speed was lowest as 
compared to the states when shields were lost. With the presumed mechanisms of Risk 
Homeostasis Theory, the speed should have been highest at the start of each shield condition, 
instead. The reason for speed being lowest at the beginning of each shield condition may lie in 
the setup of the videogame. Each round automatically started at the lowest possible speed 
level. This may have influenced the mean speed at the beginning of each game round. Even if 
participants did increase the speed level when no shield had been lost yet, the mean speed got 
automatically decreased since each game round started out on the lowest possible speed level. 
Due to the fact that the speed level was not set back to the lowest level after shields had been 
lost, this effect was not visible anymore in the further course of the game rounds. 
However, the expected compensatory effects did also not occur in further course of the 
game rounds. After the first shield had been lost, participants did not slow down as expected 
but increased their speed in the one-, three, five- and unknown shield condition. This stands in 
contrast to the direction of the anticipated compensatory effects. The loss of shields was 
thought to increase participants’ perceived level of risk and consequently make them engage 
in more cautious behavior translated into a slower speed. That this was not the case in the 
current study was furthermore visible when more shields were lost. The more shields were 
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lost in the three-, five- and unknown shield condition did not seem to have influenced the 
average speed applied in a meaningful way. After the first shield had been lost, the average 
speed stayed nearly the same until the end of the game rounds, showing a slightly increasing 
tendency. An explanation for this finding may be that participants thought to have found the 
optimal speed level at which they could be successful in dodging the meteors and gaining 
most points. The slight increase in speed could reflect their aim to emerge as the winner of the 
game. The closer the end of each game round came, the more participants may have felt the 
urge to still collect as many points as possible and for this matter they raised the speed level. 
With respect to TTC and distance to the closest meteor, the highest amount of shields 
in the one-, three-, five- and unknown-shield condition did also reflect the lowest risk 
behavior. TTC and distance to the closest meteor were the longest at the beginning of each 
condition. The contrary was expected to be found regarding Wilde’s projections. After the 
first shield loss, participants featured both a shorter TTC and distance to the closest meteor. 
The values of TTC and distance to the closest meteor remained nearly the same until the end 
of the game rounds. 
The fact that the parameter TTC behaved similarly as speed can most probably be 
explained by the calculation method of TTC being strongly dependent on speed, as mentioned 
before. And likewise as the game settings being responsible for the lowest speed at the 
beginning of each game round, they may also account for the largest distance to the closest 
meteor at the beginning of each game round. The spaceship always had the same starting 
position at the beginning of each game round and the meteors were still further away since 
they first had to fly into the screen. In the course of the game, when shields were lost, the 
spaceship was not set back to its original starting position what explains that the distance got 
shorter as participants applied a higher speed and therewith the meteors moved faster closer to 
the upcoming meteors than in the beginning of each game. 
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4.5 Homeostatic effect 
A homeostatic effect as described in Wilde’s model was not discovered in the current 
study. It was thought that a homeostatic effect was present if time played during the first game 
differed due to the various shield conditions but approximated to a relatively stable value in 
the last game. The data, however, did indicate the contrary. Time played in the first game did 
not differ as strongly as in the last game. That is, participants had more similar crash rates and 
time played at the beginning of the videogame, and differed more towards the end of the 
videogame. This may be the result of an initial unfamiliarity with the game controls. Although 
there was an exercise trial before the test trial, participants may have still tried out different 
speed levels and spaceship positions at the beginning of the game to find the optimal way of 
steering the spaceship through the meteors. They may, for example, have tried to stay at the 
bottom or at the top of the screen in hope that no meteors would appear there. As a result of 
this try-out phase, they all featured a similar time played in the first game. By the time that the 
last game was reached, though, it can be expected that participants had figured out the game 
controls and applied different strategies in order to become the overall winner of the game. 
Some may have gone faster to gain more points and others slower in order to not lose any 
shields. Different strategies applied by participants may thus serve as an explanation for a 
greater variance in time played during the last game than in the first game.  
The potential try-out phase reflected in the first game, may actually feature an 
incompletely defined target level of risk. When the various game controls are not clear yet as 
are the immediate consequences of actions, participants may not have been able to weigh the 
costs and gains of the different action alternatives and accordingly not have been able to set 
their aimed level of risk. Consequently, a comparison between perceived and targeted level of 
risk may not have been possible. The reason why no homeostatic effect was found in the 
current experimental setting may thus be rooted in a too short exercise trial. During the 
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exercise trial, participants should have been able to get familiar with the game controls and to 
define their target level of risk. Since that may have not been the case in the current study, the 
closed loop process may have not even started – or it has started but the target level of risk 
was only defined after the first game was played, during the course of the test trial. This in 
turn was not measured, since only the time played first game and in the last game were 
investigated. 
4.6 Limitations of the current study 
 Limitations of the current study may lie in the way the videogame was configured. 
Next to the already addressed weaknesses in the game design, such as the lacking 
randomization of  starting position and speed level at the beginning of each game round, the 
unknown shield condition may actually reveal more information if the game was designed 
slightly differently. According to Risk Homeostasis Theory, the unknown shield condition 
should have resulted in a more careful behavior since participants are not aware of their actual 
level of safety. When becoming familiar with the actual number of shields, though, 
compensatory actions are expected to take place. However, this could not be tested in the way 
the game was set up. Since every participant encountered the unknown shield condition only 
once, possible compensatory effects of the learning effect could not be evaluated. By 
including a second unknown shield condition with the same number of shields, the mentioned 
compensatory effects could possibly be investigated. This could give implications about the 
handling of information on safety measures installed in people’s real life environment. 
 Regarding the videogame’s transferability into real life situations, it needs to be 
mentioned that the spaceship game used in this study exclusively focuses on behavioral 
adjustments within the risk-taking environment and consequently neglects two other 
behavioral choices by which risk homeostasis can be achieved (Hoyes et al., 1996). On the 
one hand, mode migration is being ignored. In real life, people can chose to go by car instead 
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of by bike when the weather is not nice, for example. Participants in the current study could 
not change the form of transportation for the valuable cargo. The only form of transportation 
available was the spaceship. By offering participants a choice in means of transportations, 
mode migration could be integrated to the videogame. On the other hand, avoidance was not 
possible in the spaceship game. If the perceived level of risk and the target level of risk cannot 
be balanced, one may decide to actually not conduct an action at all, but to avoid it. To 
integrate this behavioral choice into the videogame would possibly not make a lot of sense, 
though, since nothing at all can be measured if no action is taking place.  
Another critical aspect with regard to real life situations is the treatment of scores in 
the videogame. The higher the speed, the more scores participants received. In real life 
situations on the road, people usually do not receive incentives for speeding, except for 
racecar drivers. Instead, they are punished with a fine or other regulatory measures. 
Consequently, it is questionable how much the current laboratory-based videogame can tell 
about risk-taking behavior in real life.  
At last, the composition of the sample was not ideal since there were three times more 
women than men. Besides, the sample consisted primarily of Dutch students. As mentioned 
before, the young age of the majority of participants may be a reason why personality traits 
could possibly not have been sufficiently identified. 
4.7 Future studies 
Positive, however, is that the current study had a great sample size what makes the 
results of this study more reliable than studies with only a few participants. Moreover, all 
tasks were digitalized what simplified and accelerated the practical implementation of the 
testing. The study design made it possible to relate possible compensatory and homeostatic 
effects to personality traits. 
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Future studies should make an attempt to replicate and extend the current findings 
with a more heterogeneous sample and a revised design of the videogame which takes the 
weaknesses of the present design into account. 
5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current study demonstrated that gender may be a predictor of  risk-
taking behavior, in contrast to birth order and personality traits. Whereas the data did to some 
extent support the presence of compensatory effects as predicted by Risk Homeostatsis 
Theory, no homeostatic effect occurred. This however does not refute the existence of 
homeostatic effects, but calls for more experimental research on the topic. Especially with 
respect to Wilde’s suggested motivational measures to eventually decrease the accident rate 
per capita over time should be a motive to further investigate the model and its mechanisms. 
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Appendix 
Introduction to the spaceship game 
“Welcome and thank you for coming. You are going to fill in some questionnaires and play a 
little video game. Before you start, please read and fill in and sign the form in front of you. 
There is also a post-it note on the screen, this is your number you will need to enter in the 
questionnaire and in the game. Please double check when entering your number, this is 
important. 
The game is about a little spaceship in a galaxy not so far away underway to deliver very 
valuable cargo. If you reach your destination sooner you will get more points. Unfortunately, 
the ship runs into a thick cloud of meteors. You are the ship’s captain and you have to stay on 
your toes to dodge the danger and get through. 
Please pay attention only to your own computer screen. Also, please do not make noise. When 
you have a question raise your hand and one of us will come to you.  
You can now start with the first part of the questionnaire. When you are done please raise 
your hand and we will start the game. When the game is done raise your hand again and we 
will switch you to the second questionnaire. When you are done with that you can collect your 
money or credits and candy for participating at that (*point*) table. 
Any questions? 
Good luck and have fun!” 
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Calculation of scores 
 
Big Five Inventory with Dutch translations 
I am someone who… 
1. Is talkative 
2. Tends to find fault with others 
3. Does a thorough job 
4. Is depressed, blue 
5. Is original, comes up with new ideas 
6. Is reserved 
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others 
8. Can be somewhat careless 
9. Is relaxed, handles stress well 
10. Is curious about many different things 
11. Is full of energy 
12. Starts quarrels with others 
13. Is a reliable worker 
14. Can be tense 
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker 
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
17. Has a forgiving nature 
18. Tends to be disorganized 
19. Worries a lot 
20. Has an active imagination 
21. Tends to be quiet 
22. Is generally trusting 
23. Tends to be lazy 
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24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
25. Is inventive 
26. Has an assertive personality 
27. Can be cold and aloof 
28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
29. Can be moody 
30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
33. Does things efficiently 
34. Remains calm in tense situations 
35. Prefers work that is routine 
36. Is outgoing, sociable 
37. Is sometimes rude to others 
38. Makes plans and follows through with them 
39. Gets nervous easily 
40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
41. Has few artistic interests 
42. Likes to cooperate with others 
43. Is easily distracted 
44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature 
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Barratt Impulsiveness Scale with Dutch translations 
1. I plan tasks carefully. 
2. I do things without thinking. 
3. I make up my mind quickly. 
4. I am happy-go-lucky. 
5. I don't "pay attention." 
6. I have "racing" thoughts. 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time. 
8. I am self controlled. 
9. I concentrate easily. 
10. I save (Ik spaar) regularly. 
11. I "squirm" (Ik "krimp ineen") at plays or lectures. 
12. I am a careful thinker. 
13. I plan for job security. 
14. I say things without thinking. 
15. I like to think about complex problems. 
16. I change jobs. 
17. I act "on impulse." 
18. I get easily bored when solving thought problems. 
19. I act on the spur of the moment. 
20. I am a steady thinker. 
21. I change residences. 
22. I buy things on impulse. 
23. I can only think about one thing at a time. 
24. I change hobbies. 
25. I spend or charge more than I earn. 
26. I often have extraneous (irrelevant) thoughts when thinking. 
27. I am more interested in the present than the future. 
28. I am restless at the theater or lectures. 
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29. I like puzzles. 
30. I am future oriented. 
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Methods of calculations for the risk parameters 
1. Speed 
 
Speed was measured in pixels per second. 
 
2. TTC 
 
TTC was measured in seconds. 
 
3. Distance to closest meteor 
 
The distance between the spaceship and the closest meteor was measured in pixels. 
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Homeostatic model relating time played to gaming behavior 
 
